Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:20 pm
Time: 8:20 pm
Results for olympic games
2 results foundAuthor: Blowe, Kevin Title: Olympic Policing During the 2012 Security Games Summary: In the months before the start of the 2012 Olympics in Stratford in east London, there was a growing anxiety amongst Londoners about the prospect of snipers in helicopters and RAF fighters in the skies, missile launchers on tower blocks and repeated predictions that Newham would experience lockdown during peak periods. Newham Monitoring Project had also been receiving enquiries from across east London for months from local residents, particularly those working with young people, who were concerned about the massive proposed policing operation and its impact at street level. London 2012 seemed to deserve its reputation as the first 'Security Games'. The Olympics presented the largest peacetime military and security operation since 1945, with a policing and security budget of around L553m. From 2010, the number of security personnel required by Olympic organisers rose sharply to an estimated 23,700 on the busiest days, more than double the original predictions, with up to 12,000 police from forces across the country and the Ministry of Defence providing more troops deployed (in uniform) to work during the Games than were then stationed in Afghanistan. Even more CCTV was installed in a city that already had the highest level of surveillance of its citizens than anywhere in the world, whilst around $80 million was spent on the construction of an 11-mile long 5000-volt electric fence around the Olympic zone. The reason for this extraordinary level of security, the Home Office argued in its March 2011 publication 'Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy,' was primarily the threat from terrorism: it promised 'maximum use of existing national security and intelligence structures' with the threat-level raised from 'substantial' to 'severe' (which assumes 'an attack is highly likely'). A secondary threat was public disorder, heightened by the perception of a weak police response to rioting the previous summer that followed the death of Mark Duggan in August 2011. The International Olympic Committee had made it clear after the riots that it expected the British government, the Metropolitan police and other domestic agencies to ensure that the Olympics passed off without incident. Arrangements were made to fast-track the trials of people accused of offences linked to the Olympics in the same highly controversial way that had followed the disorder of the previous year, with Alison Saunders, the chief CPS prosecutor for London, explicitly linking these measures to 'the lessons of the summer riots.' With a climate of fear slowly building through state institutions and the media, we were also aware of the significant pattern of racialised social "sanitisation" and exploitation that have been a hallmark of sport mega events globally, particularly where they have been held in poorer and developing areas. Activists and academics from countries including South Africa and India, which have both hosted major sport events in recent years, travelled to the UK to share their experiences of human rights abuses and 'sweep up operations' in their localities. These had had a massively detrimental and often devastating impact on the lives of local people, leaving them homeless, unemployed or vulnerable to excessive policing or criminalisation, with a legacy of property developers and real estate owners benefiting most. These were real life stories behind the promises of employment and regeneration that had been made in each host city. We recognised that an atmosphere of intensive security, focused on the borough where Newham Monitoring Project has worked for over thirty years, had the potential to negatively impact on local people. Most military and all private security personnel would work inside the 'ticketed areas' of the event venues, but in the streets surrounding the Olympic Park in Stratford and the ExCel Centre in Canning Town, it was the prospect of a massive policing operation that was our greatest concern. Newham is one of London's poorest and most ethnically diverse boroughs with the second highest Muslim population in the UK, one that had experienced long-term state surveillance, suspicion and incidents like the bungled anti-terrorism raids in 2006 on two families living in Forest Gate, who endured a terrifying ordeal based on faulty intelligence. The borough also has one of the youngest populations in London, with 23.6% of residents in 2011 aged between 10 and 24,6 coupled with a long history of difficult relationships between young people and the police. This is particularly the case over the use of stop and search powers. Details: London: Newham Monitoring Project, 2013. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://netpol.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/monitoring-the-security-games-final-report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://netpol.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/monitoring-the-security-games-final-report.pdf Shelf Number: 132168 Keywords: Event SecurityOlympic GamesPolicing DemonstrationsPublic DisorderSporting Events |
Author: Cooper, Betsy Title: The Cybersecurity of Olympic Sports: New Opportunities, New Risks Summary: The UC Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC) has released a report focused on the rapidly evolving landscape of cybersecurity in sports, with an emphasis on the Olympic Games. The report, "The Cybersecurity of Olympic Sports: New Opportunities, New Risks," is an unprecedented look into how the proliferation of new technologies in major sporting events—from digital display panels in stadiums to online ticketing systems to artificial intelligence-based scoring software - opens the door to cyberattacks that could threaten public safety, diminish the fan experience, and undermine the integrity of competition. CLTC produced the report through a partnership with Cal Athletics (the University of California, Berkeley's athletics department) as well as the Los Angeles Organizing Committee for the 2028 Olympic Games. Using the Olympic Games as a case study, the report introduces a framework for evaluating potential risks posed by digital technologies in sports, and highlights possible threats that will arise as these technologies are deployed. The study identifies key areas of risk, including hacks on stadiums, scoring systems, and photo and video replay systems; manipulation of digital systems used by athletes for training and self-care; hacks on transportation and entry systems; as well as more extreme attacks designed to induce panic or facilitate terrorism or kidnapping. The report also includes fictional news stories from the future to highlight hypothetical incidents. One shows how malicious actors seeking to disrupt the Olympics could cause mass panic in a stadium by hacking into digital display panels. Another story highlights how hackers could manipulate a software-based scoring system in gymnastics, throwing a marquee event into chaos. A third story focuses on how "smart" appliances installed in athlete' residences in the Olympics Village could be hacked and used for surveillance. The report suggests that sporting event planners should consider the potential cybersecurity implications of any new technology, noting that "organizers should press to ensure that there are tangible benefits to incorporating digital devices—and that significant risks can be mitigated—before going forward." Details: Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, 2017. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 11, 2018 at: https://cltc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Cybersecurity_of_Olympics_CLTC.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://cltc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Cybersecurity_of_Olympics_CLTC.pdf Shelf Number: 152900 Keywords: Cybercrime Cybersecurity Olympic GamesSporting Events |